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S
ince 1989, the Federal Open Market Commit-
tee (FOMC) has adopted many practices that
improve the transparency of its policy actions.
The following list includes some of those practices
and their initiation dates:
• August 1989: Policy changes in the funds rate
target are limited to multiples of 25 basis
points.
• February 1994: A press statement describing
policy actions is released at the conclusion
of any FOMC meeting at which an action was
undertaken.
• August 1997: Public acknowledgment is made
that policy is formulated in terms of a target for
the federal funds rate (the intended funds rate).
• August 1997: A quantitative intended funds
rate is included in the Directive to the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York.
• May 1999: A press statement is issued imme-
diately following the conclusion of every
FOMC meeting at which there are major shifts
in the Committee’s views about prospective
developments. Such statements provide an
indication of the policy “bias.”
• January 2000: A “balance of risks” statement
in the announcement replaces the previous
policy “bias.” After every meeting, the FOMC
issues a statement that reports the settings of
the target funds rate and the balance of risks.
• March 2002: The vote on the Directive and
the names of dissenting members, if any, are
included in the press statement.
The purpose of these changes, which have gone
a long way toward lifting the traditional veil of
secrecy over monetary policy, is to increase trans-
parency of policy, improve accountability, and pro-
vide better information to market participants about
the future direction of policy. This analysis examines
how expectations of market participants about
future policy actions have changed over the decade
during which these changes were implemented.
Our measure of how market participants
respond to “news” is the daily change in the yield
on a one-month-ahead futures contract for federal
funds. The yield on this contract can be interpreted
as a measure of a consensus forecast in the market
of the average effective federal funds rate over the
next calendar month. For example, the change in
the yield on the one-month-ahead federal funds
futures contract from the close of business yesterday
until the close of business today is a measure of the
impact of today’s news in the market. This measure
of news is not unique, but we have found it highly
correlated with measures that other researchers
have proposed, as well as with the commentary on
economic information that appears in the press.1
Small changes in our measure of news reflect
merely ambient noise in financial markets, absent
the revelation of any significant information. From
our examination of the data, we have concluded
that a change in our measure smaller than 5 basis
points in absolute value is insignificant “noise.”2
The behavior of our news measure on days that
the FOMC changed the intended federal funds rate
is shown in Figure 1. This figure is rather complex
because we have attempted to present a large amount
of data.
• The time line starts with October 1988, when
trading began in the federal funds futures
market, and continues through the December
2001 FOMC meeting when the intended fed-
eral funds rate was lowered to 1.75 percent.
• The data shown are the daily changes (close
of business to close of business) in the yield
1 For additional discussion and analysis of expectations about future
federal funds rates, see Poole and Rasche (2000) and Kuttner (2001).
2 For a detailed analysis see Poole, Rasche, and Thornton (2002).
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futures contract.
• The points plotted in light blue indicate policy
actions that were undertaken between regu-
larly scheduled FOMC meetings. Points plotted
in dark blue indicate policy actions under-
taken at regularly scheduled FOMC meetings.
• Points plotted with a square indicate 25-basis-
point changes in the intended funds rate;
points plotted with a triangle indicate 50-basis-
point changes in the intended funds rate; and
the point plotted with a diamond (November
15, 1994) indicates a 75-basis-point change
in the intended funds rate.
• The area shaded in gray, plus and minus 5
basis points, indicates the region that we have
defined as insignificant noise in this market.
• The graph is divided into three sections, each
of which reflects a different context in which
FOMC policy actions were implemented.
(i) Before August 1989, policy actions were
not announced and were frequently smaller
than 25 basis points. Our reading of the
news reports indicates that in most cases
market participants were not aware of these
policy actions on the day following the deci-
sion. These points are plotted as circles.
(ii) From August 1989 until February 1994, all
policy actions were 25 basis points or multi-
ples thereof but were not publicly announced.
However, with four exceptions, we were able
to confirm from newspaper reports that mar-
ket participants detected the policy action
on the day following the decision.
(iii) From February 1994 to the present, all
policy actions were 25 basis points or multi-
ples thereof and each action was publicly
announced by the FOMC following the
decision.
Our conclusion from this analysis is that inter-
meeting moves (the light blue points) generate news
to the market. That is, such moves generally surprise
markets. In many cases these surprises are large.
The FOMC and market participants are not well
“synched” in these circumstances. In contrast, policy
actions taken at regularly scheduled FOMC meetings,
particularly since February 1994, generate little if
any news in the market. Such actions have been
well anticipated by market participants. The data
suggest that these actions at most involved small
surprises. In these circumstances the FOMC and
market participants seem to be well synched. Our
interpretation is that financial market participants
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Lt Blue = Intermeeting target changes
Basis Points
Dk Blue = Target changes at scheduled meetings
8/89: All subsequent changes in 
multiples of 25 basis points.
2/94: All subsequent changes accompanied by
press statement at end of FOMC meeting. →  → 
NOTE:      25-basis-point change,      50-basis-point change,      75-basis-point change,      change that market was not
immediately aware had occurred (Poole, Rasche, and Thornton, 2002).
Figure 1have observed incoming information on the econ-
omy and have correctly perceived how the FOMC
will respond to that information.
The second graph, Figure 2, refers to cases where
“the dog didn’t bark”—FOMC meetings at which no
policy action was implemented.
• The time line starts with October 1988, when
trading began in the federal funds futures
market, and continues through the September
2002 FOMC meeting.
• The area shaded in gray, plus and minus 5
basis points, indicates the region that we have
defined as insignificant noise in this market.
• There are only nine points over the entire
period that we believe indicate surprises to
market participants. Four of these occurred
before February 1994 and five occurred subse-
quent to that date. All of the “surprises” are
relatively small.
The conclusion from this graph is that the FOMC
and market participants have been well synched in
those circumstances when the FOMC believed that
the incoming information on the economy was not
sufficient to justify a policy action.
If market participants are well synched with the
FOMC, then what types of information are providing
the clues about future FOMC policy actions to the
markets? Figure 3 is a case study of the period since
the beginning of December 2000 through May 31,
2002. During this period the FOMC reduced the
intended funds rate from 6.5 percent to 1.75 percent.
• The data plotted are the daily changes in
yield on the one-month-ahead federal funds
futures contract. There are a total of 374
observations.
• The area shaded in gray indicates a range of
plus and minus 5 basis points in which we
interpret the daily changes as merely ambient
noise in the market.
• Fifteen observations (4.0 percent of the total)
are positioned below the zero line in blue.
These represent events where the funds rate
futures contract fell by more than 5 basis
points.
• Ten observations (2.7 percent of the total)
are positioned above the zero line in black.
These represent events where the rate rose
by more than 5 basis points.
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NOTE: Surprises before 2/94: (1) = 3/29/89 (–.07), (2) = 8/21/91 (.06), (3) = 12/19/91 (.06), (4) = 10/7/92 (.07);
surprises since 2/94: (5) = 9/27/94 (–.08), (6) = 12/20/94 (–.11), (7) = 9/24/96 (–.13), (8) = 5/20/97 (–.09), (9) = 1/30/02 (.06).
Lt Blue = Absolute changes > 5 basis points
Dk Blue = Absolute changes ≤ 5 basis points
2/94: All subsequent changes accompanied by
























Figure 2• The front page and the Credit Markets column
in the Wall Street Journal have been checked
for news associated with each of the twenty-
five labeled events. The reports that appear
there are indicated in Table 1. In four cases
we have not found any “economic news” cited
in either source. Six of the labeled changes
are the FOMC actions noted in Figure 1
(excluding September 17, 2001, where simul-
taneously there is economic news, the inter-
meeting policy action, and the reopening of
the equity markets after the terrorist attacks).
Ten of the labeled changes are associated
with the release of economic data, includ-
ing four involving the release of employment
data. Three of the labeled changes are asso-
ciated with congressional testimony of
Chairman Greenspan. One labeled change
followed public remarks by other Federal
Reserve officials. The remaining labeled
change is the aftermath of the terrorist
attack and intermeeting policy action of
September 17, 2001.
The conclusions from Figure 3 are that (i) impor-
tant news arrives relatively infrequently and (ii) the
most significant news is FOMC actions (e.g., April 18,
2001; event 7, below zero line in blue), statements
and testimony by FOMC members (e.g., January 11,
2002; event 15, below zero line in blue), or new
economic data that market participants believe will
affect future FOMC actions (e.g., September 7, 2001;
event 10, below zero line in blue).
If markets are well synched with FOMC policy
actions, then how far in advance are accurate fore-
casts formed? In some cases the lead-time is consid-
erable. Figure 4 provides a case study using the June
2002 futures contract. In this graph, daily data on
the level of the futures rate are plotted.
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News Affecting Daily Fed Funds Futures Rate


































































NOTE: Numbers above the zero line (in black, 1-10) indicate events where the federal funds futures rate rose by more than
5 basis points. Numbers below the zero line (in blue, 1-15) indicate events where the rate fell by more than 5 basis points.
These numbers correspond to those in Table 1.
Figure 3• This contract began trading at the beginning
of September 2001. 
• The vertical lines indicate the days of FOMC
meetings and policy actions between meetings.
• The blue line indicates the intended federal
funds rate.
When the June 2002 contract initially traded,
the then-prevailing 3.5 percent intended funds rate
was anticipated to hold over the next ten months.
This conviction eroded substantially upon the
release of the August 2001 advanced retail sales
and employment numbers (see event 1 in Table 2).
Going into the terrorist attacks of 9/11, market par-
ticipants saw a 3.25 percent intended funds rate in
June 2002.
With the terrorist attacks, market expectations
of the June 2002 intended funds rate were revised
sharply downward to about 2.5 percent, well below
the intended funds rate that prevailed over the
remainder of September 2001 (see event 2 in Table 2).
Expectations gradually eroded by a cumulative 75
basis points from mid-September until shortly after
the November FOMC meeting, during which time
the FOMC reduced the intended funds rate by 100
basis points in two steps.
With the news that the Taliban had left Kabul
and the release of data on October retail sales in mid-
November, expectations of the June 2002 intended
funds rate were revised sharply upward to almost
2.5 percent (see event 3 in Table 2). This euphoria
lasted only a few days until the release of data on
new home construction in October (see event 4 in
Table 2) and existing-home sales and consumer
confidence (see event 5 in Table 2). At this time the
then-prevailing intended funds rate of 2.0 percent
was expected to continue until mid-2002.
The release of manufacturing data for November
generated an upward revision of expectations of
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Futures Rate Changes and Reported News Events
Futures 
Event Date rate change News reported
1 1/9/2001 0.06 No front-page reports 1/10/2001.
2 1/12/2001 0.07 “Retail sales inched up 0.1% in December, though downward revisions 
for October and November cancelled that slight gain. Core prices rose 
0.3%.”WSJ 1/15/2001, p. 1
3 2/1/2001 0.06 “The jobless rate edged up to 4.2% last month, its highest level since 
September 1999 but only a bit above the near 30-year-low of 4% set in 
December.”WSJ 2/5/2001, p. 1
4 2/28/2001 0.07 “Greenspan dashed hopes for an imminent interest-rate cut, pushing 
stocks down. The Fed chairman told a House panel that recession 
poses a greater risk than inflation as consumer confidence continues 
to slide, suggesting that a rate cut is likely at the Fed’s regular March 20 
meeting. But he disappointed investors who had hoped for signs of an
earlier reduction.”WSJ 3/1/2001, p. 1
5 3/23/2001 0.07 No front-page reports 3/26/2001.
6 4/10/2001 0.08 No front-page reports 4/11-12/2001. “The bond market received a blow 
when Fed officials’ remarks pointed to the chances of a recovery of 
the U.S. economy sooner rather than later, reducing hopes among some
market participants that future rate cuts will be as aggressive as previ-
ously anticipated. William Poole, president of the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis, said that while the U.S. economy has slowed, ‘weaker near-
term prospects seem not to have dimmed the long-run outlook of 
robust growth’.”WSJ 4/11/2001, p. C19
4/11/2001 0.06 “In public appearances this week, Fed officials have sounded a generally 
upbeat tone on the economy, with some projecting an acceleration 
of growth after a weak first half. Analysts said that suggests the Fed 
isn’t concerned enough about the economy or other factors to cut 
rates immediately.”WSJ 4/12/2001, p. C17
7 6/27/2001 0.08 “The Fed cut interest rates for the sixth time this year, lowering its federal-
funds target by a quarter point to 3.75%. Though the cut was the 
smallest this year, the central bank signaled it was poised to keep easing
credit conditions. The Fed move didn’t jar the market, even though 
many analysts had predicted a half-point cut.”WSJ 6/28/2001, p. 1
8 9/4/2001 0.09 “The manufacturing sector appears to have turned a corner in August, 
as the NAPMs index of manufacturing activity showed significant 
improvement.”WSJ 9/5/2001, p. 1
9 9/20/2001 0.07 “At a Senate hearing, Greenspan painted a grim picture of short-term 
economic weakness, citing weak corporate earnings and layoffs. A 
survey of economic forecasters said the economy is heading into a 
recession, and that it will last at least through the year.”WSJ 9/21/2001,
p. 1
10 12/5/2001 0.06 “Manufacturing is showing incipient signs of recovery for the first time 
in over a year. Meanwhile, the service sector rebounded last month 
after suffering its worst month on record in October.”WSJ 12/6/2001, p. 1
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Futures Rate Changes and Reported News Events
Futures 
Event Date rate change News reported
1 1/2/2001 –0.09 “Manufacturing activity slowed last month to its weakest point in almost
10 years, as the NAPM index fell to 43.7 from 47.7 in November.”
WSJ 1/3/2001, p.1
1/3/2001 –0.29 “The Fed cut a key interest rate, sending markets soaring. The central 
bank, in a rare move between meetings, lowered the federal funds 
target to 6.0% from 6.5%.”WSJ 1/4/2001, p. 1
1/4/2001 –0.19 “Most retail chains reported disappointing December sales, making the
holiday shopping season the worst in at least five years.”WSJ 1/5/2001, p. 1
2 1/18/2001 –0.06 “Housing starts edged up last month but applications for building permits
fell, suggesting a further slowdown.”WSJ 1/19/2001, p. 1
3 1/30/2001 –0.06 “Consumer confidence plunged in January, cementing expectations that
the Fed will cut rates by half a point and sparking hopes of an even 
bigger cut.”WSJ 1/31/2001, p. 1
4 2/23/2001 –0.08 No front-page reports 2/26/2001.
5 3/14/2001 –0.10 No front-page reports 3/15/2001.
6 3/22/2001 –0.06 “Leading economic indicators fell for the fourth time in five months in 
February, but still didn’t point to a recession.”WSJ 3/23/2001, p. 1
7 4/18/2001 –0.42 “The Fed cut short-term interest rates by a half point in a surprise move 
that sent stocks soaring.”WSJ 4/19/2001, p. 1
8 5/4/2001 –0.07 “Unemployment jumped to 4.5% in April from 4.3% the month before, 
raising fears that consumers will curtail spending and spark a recession.”
WSJ 5/7/2001, p. 1
9 5/15/2001 –0.07 “The Fed cut short-term rates by half a point, its fifth big rate reduction
in as many months, and did nothing to signal that it is ending its 
campaign to jump-start the economy.”WSJ 5/16/2001, p. 1
10 9/7/2001 –0.12 “The surge in unemployment is raising fears that the business cycle may
be entering a new and harrowing phase.”WSJ 9/10/2001, p. 1
11 9/14-19/2001 –0.41 September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on World Trade Center
12 10/2/2001 –0.08 “The Fed cut the target for its federal-funds rate to 2.5% from 3% and 
left the door open to further rate cuts, as it continued an aggressive 
campaign to stimulate the economy.”WSJ 10/3/2001, p. 1
13 11/6/2001 –0.11 “The Fed cut interest rates by half a point to their lowest level since 1961
and, citing a deteriorating economy, suggested more cuts could be in 
store.”WSJ 11/7/2001, p. 1
14 12/7/2001 –0.07 “A rise in the jobless rate last month to its highest level in over six years
damped predictions that an economic recovery has begun. Economists
expect the Fed to lower rates again tomorrow.”WSJ 12/10/2001, p. 1
15 1/1/2002 –0.09 “Greenspan said the economy shows signs of stabilizing but still faces 
major risks before a sustainable recovery can begin. The downbeat 
assessment raises the odds the Fed again will cut interest rates at its 
meeting this month.”WSJ 1/14/2002, p. 1
NOTE: The first 10 numbers (corresponding to the upper numbers in Figure 3, in black) indicate events where the funds rate futures
contract rose by more than 5 basis points. The next 15 numbers (corresponding to the lower numbers in Figure 3, in blue) indicate
events where the rate fell by more than 5 basis points.
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Futures Rate Changes and Reported News Events
Futures 
Event Date rate change News reported
1 9/6/2001 –0.15 “Discount stores performed well in August, but specialty-apparel retailers
and high-end department stores suffered.”WSJ 9/7/2001, p. 1
9/7/2001 –0.20 “The surge in unemployment is raising fears that the business cycle may
be entering a new and harrowing phase.”WSJ 9/10/2001, p. 1
2 9/13/2001 –0.63 September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on World Trade Center
3 11/13/2001 0.06 “Rebels Seize Kabul As Taliban Forces Flee Afghan Capital”WSJ 11/14/2001,
p. 1
11/14/2001 0.16 “Retail sales shot up a record 7.1% in October. The surge was led by a 
26.4% jump in auto sales, which were aided by zero-percent financing
and other incentives.”WSJ 11/15/2001, p. 1
11/15/2001 0.21 —
11/16/2001 0.13 “Consumer prices slipped in October amid continued drops in energy 
prices, a possible positive sign for reigniting spending. But industrial 
output fell for the 13th straight month, the longest string of declines 
since the Depression.”
“Hiring plans are approaching a weakness not seen since the 
recessionary early months of 1991—Manpower’s survey of nearly 16,000
companies says.”WSJ 11/19/2001, p. 1
4 11/19/2001 –0.15 “New-home construction fell 1.3% in October and builders requested 
permits at the slowest pace in four years, another sign that the housing 
market is slowing.”WSJ 11/20/2001, p.1
5 11/27/2001 –0.25 “Existing-home sales rose 5.5% last month after a weak September. But 
consumer confidence, hurt by layoffs, slid in November to an eight-
year low.”WSJ 11/28/2001, p. 1
6 12/5/2001 0.16 “Manufacturing is showing incipient signs of recovery for the first time 
in over a year. Meanwhile, the service sector rebounded last month 
after suffering its worst month on record in October.”WSJ 12/6/2001, p. 1
7 12/7/2001 –0.14 “A rise in the jobless rate last month to its highest level in over six years
damped predictions that an economic recovery has begun. Economists
expect the Fed to lower rates again tomorrow.”WSJ 12/10/2001, p. 1
8 1/11/2002 –0.19 “Greenspan said the economy shows signs of stabilizing but still faces 
major risks before a sustainable recovery can begin. The downbeat 
assessment raises the odds the Fed again will cut interest rates at its 
meeting this month.”WSJ 1/14/2002, p. 1
9 3/7/2002 0.07 “Greenspan gave the Senate a considerably more upbeat assessment of
the economy than he did in House testimony last week. The Fed 
chairman said recent evidence suggests ‘an economic expansion is 
already well under way’.” WSJ 3/8/2002, p. 1
10 3/26/2002 –0.06 “Consumer confidence surged in March to its highest level since before
the Sept. 11 attacks, suggesting the U.S. may enjoy a broad economic
recovery.”WSJ 3/27/2002, p.1
Table 2the June 2002 intended funds rate (see event 6 in
Table 2), but this expectation was reversed when
November employment data became available two
days later (see event 7 in Table 2).
From the December 2001 FOMC meeting until
the end of May 2002, the June 2002 contract traded
in the range of 1.75 to 2.0 percent, with the excep-
tion of a couple of days in January. The yield briefly
dropped below 1.75 percent after the January 11,
2002, Congressional testimony of Chairman
Greenspan, which was widely interpreted as pessi-
mistic and as a signal that an additional cut in the
intended funds rate might be forthcoming (see event
8 in Table 2). This effect was quite short-lived, and
within a few days the yield was back within the 1.75
to 2.0 percent range. After the Chairman’s Senate
testimony on March 7, 2002, the yield moved to 2.0
percent, indicating a conviction that no later than
the May 2002 FOMC meeting the intended funds
rate would be raised by 25 basis points (see event 9
in Table 2). Between the March FOMC meeting and
mid-April, this conviction gradually eroded, and
for the month prior to the May FOMC meeting a
firmly held conviction prevailed in the market that
no change in the intended funds rate would occur
before the June FOMC meeting.
We conclude, from the small average size of
market surprises concerning FOMC policy changes,
that in recent years the market has had an excellent
understanding of what the FOMC is doing. For the
most part, rate changes occur in response to news
that should change rates. These findings, we believe,
provide strong evidence of the payoff from greater
Fed transparency and greater regularity in monetary
policy actions.
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